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Abstract. Bringer et al. proposed two cryptographic protocols for the
computation of Hamming distance. Their first scheme uses Oblivious
Transfer and provides security in the semi-honest model. The other
scheme uses Committed Oblivious Transfer and is claimed to provide
full security in the malicious case. The proposed protocols have direct
implications to biometric authentication schemes between a prover and
a verifier where the verifier has biometric data of the users in plain form.
In this paper, we show that their protocol is not actually fully secure
against malicious adversaries. More precisely, our attack breaks the sound-
ness property of their protocol where a malicious user can compute a
Hamming distance which is different from the actual value. For biomet-
ric authentication systems, this attack allows a malicious adversary to
pass the authentication without knowledge of the honest user’s input
with at most O(n) complexity instead of O(2n), where n is the input
length. We propose an enhanced version of their protocol where this at-
tack is eliminated. The security of our modified protocol is proven using
the simulation-based paradigm. Furthermore, as for efficiency concerns,
the modified protocol utilizes Verifiable Oblivious Transfer which does
not require the commitments to outputs which improves its efficiency
significantly.
Keywords: Biometric Identification; Authentication; Hamming distance;
Privacy; Committed Oblivious Transfer
1 Introduction
Recently, several commercial organizations have invested in secure elec-
tronic authentication systems to reliably verify identity of individuals.
Biometric authentication systems are receiving a lot of public attention
and becoming a crucial solution to many authentication and identity man-
agement problems because of cost-effective improvements in sensor tech-
nologies and in efficiency of matching algorithms [1]. Biometric data (i.e.
templates) of a user is inherently unique. This uniqueness provides assur-
ance to individuals to be securely authenticated for accessing an environ-
ment provided that the biometric data is kept as a secret. The biometric
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data cannot be directly used with conventional encryption techniques be-
cause the data itself is inherently noisy [2]. Namely, whenever two samples
of data are extracted from the same fingerprint, they will not be exactly
the same. In this context, in order to eliminate the noisy nature of the
biometric templates, several error correction techniques were proposed in
the literature [3–5].
Biometric authentication over an insecure network raises more secu-
rity and privacy issues. The primary security issue is the protection of the
plain biometric templates against a malicious adversary because they can-
not be replaced with new ones, once they are compromised. The common
biometric authentication system is as follows: For each user, the biomet-
ric template is stored in a database during the enrollment phase. In the
verification phase a new fresh acquisition of a user is compared to the
template of the same individual stored in the database. The verification
phase can either be processed within a smart card (i.e, on-card matching),
or in a system outside the card (i.e, off-card matching) [6]. Since the bio-
metric template is not necessarily transferred to outside environment, the
on-card matching technique protects the template. In both techniques, au-
thentication protocols should not expose the biometric template without
the user’s agreement. In order to ensure privacy of the user, the biometric
template should be stored in an encrypted form in a database and no one,
including the server, can learn any information on the biometric data in
plain form. But still, it should be possible to verify whether a user is
authentic [7].
In order to thwart the security and privacy issues described above for
biometric authentication several matching algorithms are proposed in the
literature. Many of them utilize the computation of the Hamming distance
of two binary biometric templates. Note that the Hamming distance does
not reveal any significant information to any polynomially bounded ad-
versary. In this context, Workshop on Applied Homomorphic Cryptogra-
phy (WAHC 13) (co-located with Financial Cryptography 2013), Bringer
et al. [8] proposed two secure Hamming distance computation schemes
based on Oblivious Transfer. In their proposals, the authors integrate the
advantages of both biometrics and cryptography in order to improve the
overall security and privacy of an authentication system. The first scheme
is solely based on 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) and it achieves full
security in the semi-honest setting, and one-sided security in the malicious
setting. One can of course use one of the efficient OT protocols for the
semi-honest setting [9,10]. The second scheme uses Committed Oblivious
Transfer (COT) and is claimed to provide full security against malicious
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tance of bit strings, the authors utilizes the only COT protocol of bit
strings that is due to Kiraz et al. [11].
(a) Contributions
In this paper, we first revisit the Hamming distance computation protocol
SHADE of Bringer et al. [8]. [12] generalizes and proposes improvements
over [8] in the semi-honest setting. We show that SHADE is in fact not
sound in the malicious model. More precisely, we show that the full scheme
has a weakness allowing any malicious adversary to violate soundness
property of the protocol, i.e., a different value of Hamming distance from
the actual one.
The protocol flaw resides in the method used for validation of the
inputs of a user. Using zero-knowledge proofs, the protocol aims to force
the user to submit valid inputs, i.e. pairs of integers (x, y) that differ
by 1. The method succeeds at checking the difference, however, it fails
at validation of the pairs, i.e. a malicious party can submit bogus pairs
(x˜, y˜) and can pass the verification steps without being detected. Since
SHADE computes the Hamming distance by using the outputs of COT,
a verifier would compute an incorrect Hamming distance. We would like
to highlight that any fake Hamming distance can be set in advance. As a
practical example for biometric authentication, we show that a malicious
adversary can pass the authentication by running the algorithm at most
O(n) times (instead of running O(2n) times, where n is the input length.).
Last but not least, an adversary with knowledge of the distribution of
inputs can mount a more powerful attack. Note that this attack is of
independent interest and may be applied to other schemes.
In order to eliminate this weakness, we propose a new method for
input validation. This way, we remove the fault in the protocol and en-
hance the security of it. We also show that the computational complexity
of the fixed protocol is comparable with the insecure protocol. Moreover,
we optimize the new input validation method for biometric authentica-
tion systems. We prove the security of our protocol using the ideal/real
simulation paradigm in the standard model [13–15] and [16].
Lastly, we consider the efficiency of the protocol and show that run-
ning a COT is not necessary in the full scheme of the protocol. We show
that VOT is sufficient instead of using complete COT protocol which con-
tains additional commitments and zero-knowledge proofs [17]. This leads
to a considerable improvement in the computational complexity of the
protocol.
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(b) Organization
Section 2 gives related work on the computation of Hamming distance
and biometric authentication systems. Section 3 provides security and
privacy model for biometric authentication protocols. Section 4 reviews
the two schemes in the protocol, the basic scheme which uses OTs and
the full scheme based on COT of bit-strings. In Section 5, we present an
attack on the full scheme of Bringer et al. which breaks the soundness
property. In Section 6, we propose a security fix and discuss the efficiency
of their protocol in the malicious model. Here, we show that VOT is
sufficient instead of COT. In Section 7 we prove our fixed protocol using
the simulation-based paradigm. The complexity analysis of the proposed
protocol is shown in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
There has been a large amount of research done on the security and
efficiency of the biometric authentication systems. In this section, we
review the most recent works for biometric authentication.
Hamming distance together with Oblivious Transfers is one of the
most elegant tools used in biometric authentication systems. For exam-
ple, Jarrous and Pinkas propose the binHDOT protocol [18] to compute
Hamming distance based on 1-out-of-2 Committed Oblivious Transfer
with Constant Difference (COTCD) of Jarecki and Shmatikov [19] and
Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE) of Hazay and Lindell [20]. The
protocol also uses commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to guarantee
that each party follows the protocol. This protocol provides full security
in the malicious model. One OPE protocol and n COTCDs are invoked
to compute the Hamming distance between two strings of n bits.
The SCiFI (Secure Computation of Face Recognition) of Osadchy et
al. is the first secure face identification system which is well suited for
real-life applications [21]. SCiFI system consists of two parts: a client
and a server. The server prepares a face recognition database that con-
tains representations of face images. This computation is done oﬄine.
In the verification phase, a client prepares her face representation and
then a cryptographic protocol which uses Paillier encryption and Obliv-
ious Transfer running between the server and the client. The authors
implemented a complete SCiFI system in which a face is represented
with a string of 900 bits. The authors designed the system by aiming the
minimal online overhead: the most significant requirement for computing
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1-out-of-2 OTs.
Bringer et al. [22] used biometric authentication/identification for ac-
cess control. Note that it is important to securely store the biometric
template on the server and using conventional encryption schemes for
securing the biometric template can provide a strong protection. Note
also that conventional cryptography requires an exact match while bio-
metrics always have a threshold value, therefore biometric authentication
over the encrypted domain is a challenging task. In [22], a cryptographic
scheme is given for biometric identification over an encrypted domain
which uses Bloom Filters with Storage and Locality-Sensitive Hashing.
Their paper is interesting because it proposes the first biometric authen-
tication/identification scheme over encrypted binary templates which is
stored in the server’s database.
In another paper, Bringer et al. [23] proposed a security model for
biometric-based authentication protocols, relying on the Goldwasser-Micali
cryptosystem [24]. This system allows the biometric match to be per-
formed in the encrypted domain in such a way that the server cannot
identify which user is authenticating. The proposed system requires stor-
age of biometric templates in plain form. In order to protect the privacy,
the system ensures that the biometric feature stored in the database can-
not be explicitly linked to any identity, but the DB only verifies whether
the received data belongs to an identity in the database.
Erkin et al. [25] propose a privacy preserving face recognition system
on encrypted messages which is based on the standard Eigenface recog-
nition system [26]. In their protocol design, they utilized semantically se-
cure Paillier homomorphic public-key encryption schemes and Damg˚ard,
Geisler and Krøigaard (DGK) cryptosystem [27,28]. Later, Sadeghi et al.
make an improvement over the efficiency of this system [29] by merging
the eigenface recognition algorithm using homomorphic encryption and
Yao’s garbled circuits. Their protocol improves the scheme proposed by
Erkin et al. significantly since it has only a constant number of rounds and
most of the computation and communication is performed during the pre-
computation phase. Schneider and Zohner [30] provide an improvement
over [29] and [21] by using the GMW protocol [31].
Tuyls et al. [32] propose a template protection scheme for fingerprint
based authentication in order to protect biometric data. During the en-
rollment phase, client’s biometric features X is extracted, the Helper
Data [33] W is computed (that is required by the error-correction mech-
anism), a one-way hash function H is applied to S and the data (client,
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W, H(S )) is stored on the server. Here, S is a randomly chosen secret
value such that G(X, W )=S for a shielding function G [34]. During the
verification phase, after client’s noisy biometric data X is extracted, the
server sends W back to the sensor. The sensor computes S = G(X,W )
and H(S). Then, the server compares H(S ) with H(S), and grants access
if the results are equal. The Helper Data is sent over the public channel,
i.e. an adversary may obtain W. Tuyls et al. however designed the system
in such a way that the adversary obtains minimal information about X
by capturing W.
Kulkarni et al. [35] propose a biometric authentication scheme based
on Iris Matching. Their scheme uses the somewhat homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme of Boneh et al. [36] which allows an arbitrary number of
additions of ciphertexts but supports only one multiplication operation
between the ciphertexts. The scheme is based on Paillier encryption and
bilinear pairings. This scheme consists of two phases: Enrollment phase
and Verification phase. During the Enrollment phase, necessary keys are
first generated by the server and then sent to the client securely. Secondly,
the client’s biometric data is XORed with the key, and a mask value is
XORed with a mask key. Both XORed values are sent to the server. Dur-
ing the Verification (authentication) phase, the client sends an encryption
of the authenticated biometric data to compute the distance. The protocol
is proven to be secure in the semi-honest model.
Kerschbaum et al. [37] propose an authentication scheme in a different
setting. In particular, they assume that there are two parties where each
of them has a fingerprint template. They would like to learn whether
the templates match, i.e. generated from the same fingerprint. However,
they do not want to reveal the templates if there is no match. Their
protocol is secure only in the semi-honest model using secure multi-party
computation as a building block.
Barni et al. propose a privacy preserving authentication scheme for
finger-code templates by using homomorphic encryption which is secure
only in the semi-honest model [38, 39]. Their protocol allows the use of
the Euclidean distances to compare fingerprints in such a way that the
biometric data is reduced for computing a smaller encrypted value that
is sent to the server.
3 Security and Privacy Model
We adopt the standard simulation-based definition of ideal/real security
paradigm in the standard model which is already highlighted in [13–15]
7and [16]. In simulation-based security, the view of a protocol execution in
a real setting is compared (a statistical/computational indistinguishable
manner) as if the computation is executed in an ideal setting where the
parties send inputs to an ideal functionality F = (F1,F2) that performs
the computation and returns its result.
In an ideal setting, the parties send their inputs x and y to an ideal
functionality F who computes F(x, y) (which is the output of the Ham-
ming distance in our setting) and sends F1(x, y) to the first party and
F2(x, y) to the second party (F1(x, y) or F2(x, y) can be ⊥ if only one
party is required to learn the output). Note that the adversary, who con-
trols one of the parties, can choose to send any input to the functionality
F , while the honest party always sends its specified input. In a real execu-
tion of a protocol ΠF for a functionality F , one of the parties is assumed
to be corrupted under the complete control of an adversary A. Note that
we assume that the adversary A corrupts one of the two parties at the
beginning of the protocol execution and is fixed throughout the compu-
tation (as it is known as static adversary model).
Informally, a protocol ΠF is secure if for every real-model adversary
A interacting with an honest party running the protocol, there exists an
ideal-model adversary S interacting with the trusted party computing f ,
such that the output of the adversary and the honest party in the real
model is computationally indistinguishable from the output of simulator
and the honest party in the ideal model. More formally,
Definition 1. (Simulation-based security) Let F and the protocol ΠF be
as above. We say that the protocol ΠF securely computes the ideal func-
tionality F if for any probabilistic polynomial-time real-world adversary
A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time an ideal-model adversary
S (called the simulator) such that
REALΠF ,A(x, y)x,y s.t. |x|=|y| ≈ IDEALF ,S(x, y)x,y s.t. |x|=|y|
Note that the above definition implies that the parties already know
the input lengths (by the requirement that |x| = |y|).
Note also that VOT and COT protocols are used as subprotocols.
In [40, 41], it is shown that it is sufficient to analyze the security of a
protocol in a hybrid model in which the parties interact with each other
and assumed to have access to a trusted third party that computes a
VOT (resp. COT) protocol for them. Thus, in the security analysis of our
protocol the simulator plays the role of the trusted third party for VOT
(resp. COT) functionality when simulating the corrupted party. Roughly
speaking, in the hybrid model, parties run an arbitrary protocol like in
8 Mehmet Sabır Kiraz1, Ziya Alper Genc¸1,3, and Su¨leyman Kardas¸1,2
the real model, but have access to a trusted third party that computes
a functionality (in our case VOT or COT) like in the ideal model. A
protocol is secure if any attack on the real model can be carried out in
the hybrid model.
4 The Basic and the Full Scheme of Bringer et al.
In this section, we briefly describe the basic and the full scheme of [8]
used for computation of Hamming distance between two bit strings. The
basic scheme uses oblivious transfer (OT) and provides full security when
the parties are semi-honest and one-sided security in the malicious model.
The full scheme uses committed oblivious transfer (COT) [11] and zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge [17] to compute the Hamming distance in
malicious model. Each scheme has two options to select the party which
computes and outputs the result meaning that each party may act as a
server and the other as a client.
(a) The Basic Scheme
The basic scheme is designed to provide secure and efficient method for
computing the Hamming distance between two bit strings in semi-honest
model. The intuition behind this protocol is that if both parties are semi-
honest, the OT protocols are sufficient to preserve privacy.
The basic scheme in [8] which is secure against semi-honest adversaries
is as follows:
Two parties P1 and P2 are willing to compute the Hamming distance of
their private inputs X = {x1, . . . , xn} and Y = {y1, . . . , yn}, respectively.
At the first step, P1 randomly picks r1, . . . , rn ∈R Zn+1 and computes
R =
n∑
i=1
ri. For i = 1, · · · , n, the parties run an OT protocol in which P1
acts as the sender and P2 acts as the receiver. More precisely, P1 inputs
(ri+xi, ri+ x˜i) where x˜i = 1−xi and P2 inputs yi. At the end of the OT
protocol, P2 receives ti = (ri + xi) if yi = 0 and (ti = ri + x˜i) otherwise.
Next, P2 computes T =
n∑
i=1
ti. In the last step,
– 1st Option: P2 sends T to P1. Next, P1 outputs T −R.
– 2nd Option: P1 sends R to P2. Next, P2 outputs T −R.
The privacy is still guaranteed in the presence of semi-honest adver-
saries as they proved in Section 6 of [8]. Furthermore, the efficiency of
9the basic scheme of Bringer et al. [8] was further improved in [12]. The
authors also mention that the basic scheme can be optimized by using
the state of the art techniques, i.e. extended oblivious transfer, as first
proposed by Ishai et al. in [42] and later improved in [43]. This technique
leads to an efficient construction which extends k OTs to n OTs (k < n)
in the random oracle model that is secure against only semi-honest ad-
versaries (note that hash functions can be replaced with RO model in the
real case).
(b) The Full Scheme
The full scheme of Bringer et al. considers the case where the parties
are assumed to be malicious. Note that running OT protocol does not
prevent a party from modifying her input. Secondly, the receiver may
send a different value than the actual OT output that she computes. In
order to prevent such scenarios, the authors propose to use the 1-out-of-2
Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) protocol of Kiraz et al. presented
in [11] (see Figure 1). Though, in Section 5, we show that the idea of
input validation for P1 is not sufficient and can be exploited with success.
Sender
Private Input: x0, x1
Private Output: ⊥
Common Input:
CommitS(x0),
CommitS(x1),CommitC(y)
COT←→
Common Output:
CommitC(xy)
Chooser
Private Input: y
Private Output: xy
Fig. 1. Committed Oblivious Transfer
Before we proceed, let’s continue with the description of the full
scheme (refer to [8] for more details).
– At the first step of the protocol, P2 commits to her input bits yi’s and
proves in zero-knowledge [17] that each yi is either equal to 0 or equal
to 1.
– At the same time, P1 generates random elements ri’s from the plain-
text space of the commitment scheme and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri. Next,
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she commits to ai and bi where (ai, bi) = (ri+xi, ri+x˜i)
1. Let’s denote
Commit(M) for the commitment functionality of a message M 2. P1
publishes the commitments Ai = Commit(ai) and Bi = Commit(bi).
Furthermore, using these commitments she proves that ai and bi differ
by 1 for each i.
– Next, the COT protocol is run for each i. At the end of each COT, P2
receives ti = ri + (xi ⊕ yi) and both parties receive Ci = Commit(ti).
When all the COTs are run, P2 computes the sum T =
n∑
i=1
ti.
– At this point, there are two options:
• 1st Option: P2 computes C = C1 · · ·Cn, and because of the un-
derlying homomorphic property we have Commit(T ) = C [8]. P2
sends T to P1 and proves in zero-knowledge that C indeed com-
mits to T . P1 also computes C = C1 · · ·Cn and verifies the proof.
If all verifications are successful, P1 outputs T −R.
• 2nd Option: P1 computes K = Commit(2R + n) = A1 · · ·An ·
B1 · · ·Bn. P1 sends R to P2 and proves in zero-knowledge that K
indeed commits to 2R+ n. P2 computes K = A1 · · ·An ·B1 · · ·Bn
and verifies that K = Commit(2R + n). If all verifications are
successful, P2 outputs T −R.
The authors in [8] claim that the above scheme is fully secure against
malicious adversaries. However, in the next section we show that a mali-
cious P1 can easily break the soundness property of the scheme.
5 Security and Efficiency Analysis of the Protocol by
Bringer et al.
We are now ready to describe the protocol flaw of the full scheme in
detail. The security flaw is due to the proof for validation of P1’s input
bits. The flaw allows a malicious P1 to change the Hamming distance
between her input and P2’s input. In the next section, we propose a
solution to fix the flaw by designing a new proof for validation. We show
that the complexity of the new proof for the validation of P1’s input bits
for biometric authentication systems is significantly reduced.
1 The commit functionality of [11] is basically a (2,2)-threshold homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme (e.g., ElGamal [44], Paillier [45]). Let (pkP1,P2 , (skP1 , skP2)) denote
public and private key pairs of the encryption scheme where pkP1,P2 is the common
public key, and skP1 , skP2 are the corresponding private key shares of P1 and P2,
respectively.
2 Note that because of the underlying encryption scheme Commit includes randomness
and public key, and we hide them for the sake of simplicity.
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Furthermore, we also analyze the protocol from the efficiency perspec-
tive and show that the complexity of the protocol can be significantly im-
proved. COT protocol is basically designed as a sub-protocol in order to
prevent possible malicious behaviors between sender and receiver, where
the committed output of COT is expected to be used in further parts of
the system. However, the committed outputs of COT are not used in the
case that P1 computes the Hamming distance. Hence, we point out that
Verifiable Oblivious Transfer is sufficient in the case that P1 computes the
Hamming distance. This eliminates to compute n commitments together
with the zero-knowledge proofs (for each run of COT protocol). In this
way, we improves the efficiency of the protocol by using VOT instead of
COT when P1 is the server.
(a) Attack to the Full Scheme
The protocol is not sound in the case where P1 is malicious. This is
because P1 is free in the sense that she can commit to any pair such
that the absolute value of the difference of the encrypted values is 1, i.e.
P1 proves that |bi − ai| = 1 where the pair (ai, bi) is supposed to be
(ri + xi, ri + x˜i). However, a malicious P1 may choose invalid pairs in a
special way together with the proofs that difference between each pair
is equal to 1. Our attack uses the fact that at the end of each COT, P2
receives either ti = ri + g or ti = ri +h and computes the sum T =
n∑
i=1
ti,
where g, h are within the finite cyclic group. Note that g is expected to be
equal to xi and h to x˜i. However, with a careful choosing of g’s and h’s,
some g’s can be neutralized by some h’s in this sum. Hence, the soundness
property of the protocol can be violated. In fact, the security proof of [8]
does not explicitly use the zero-knowledge proof of the statement leading
to the flaw in their security analysis.
Before we describe the attack it is important to highlight that the
underlying COT scheme uses threshold ElGamal encryption as a com-
mitment mechanism, i.e. Commit(xi) = Enc(xi) where xi ∈ G where G
is a large finite cyclic group (of a prime order) [11]. This guarantees the
existence of the inverse of n.
Without loss of generality assume that #0’s in P2’s input Y is ` (i.e.,
#1’s in Y is n − `). A predetermined fake Hamming distance can be
computed with the knowledge of #0’s (similarly #1’s) in P2 as follows:
a malicious P1 uses (ai, bi) = (ri + g, ri + h) for an arbitrary Hamming
distance HD = `g + (n−`)h such that g−h = 1, where g, h are the group
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elements. Then,
HD = `g + (n− `)(g − 1) = ng − n+ `.
For an example, if a malicious P1 desires Hamming distance HD to be
0 then she chooses g = 1 − `n−1. Next, h= g-1= -`n−1. Hence, P1 may
use (ai, bi)=(ri+(1− `n−1), ri− `n−1) as input. To be more concrete, the
attack is given as follows:
– P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each yi is either 0 or 1.
P1 then generates random ri’s and computes R=
n∑
i=1
ri.
– Next, instead of following the protocol, P1 computes (ai, bi)=(ri+(1−
`n−1), ri−`n−1) and publishes Ai = Commit(ai) and Bi = Commit(bi).
Note that for each i, |bi − ai| = 1 and hence, the proofs pass success-
fully.
– At the end of each COT, P2 receives either ti = ri + (1 − `n−1) or
ti = ri − `n−1. After COTs are run, P2 computes the sum
T =
n∑
i=1
ti
=
∑
i|yi=0
(
ri + (1− `n−1)
)
+
∑
i|yi=1
(
ri − `n−1
)
= `(1− `n−1) + (n− `)(−`n−1) +
n∑
i=1
ri
=
n∑
i=1
ri
= R.
Therefore, the Hamming distance dH(X,Y )=T − R is equal to 0.
We stress that the weakness in the scheme is destructive as we prove
that a relatively insignificant information leakage causes computation of
a completely inaccurate result. Namely, without knowledge of the real X,
P1 fools P2 into outputting an incorrect Hamming distance value without
being detected. Furthermore, a malicious P1 with the prior knowledge
of ` is capable of manipulating HD by computing the values g and h
using the above-mentioned equation. This is interesting because Hamming
distance is not necessarily equal to 0 or 1. For example, in [46], the authors
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propose a privacy-preserving protocol for iris-based authentication using
Yao’s garbled circuits. They show that Hamming distance between two
iris codes owned by the same person is rarely close to 0 (and similarly it is
rarely close to n for different persons). Therefore, the scalability feature
of our attack can be easily adopted to various general settings.
In this part, we propose the most general case and in the next section
we give a practical attack for biometric authentication schemes reducing
the computational complexity of an attacker from O(2n) to O(n), where
n is the input length. Namely, an attacker without any prior knowledge
can authenticate herself using only n trials instead of 2n.
(b) A Special Case: Apply the Attack to Biometric
Authentication Systems
In the previous section, we described the most general case, i.e., for any
system that uses the proposed Hamming distance protocol. We now apply
the proposed attack as a practical example on biometric authentication
systems with full success. Note that the matching procedure for finger-
print, palm print or iris actually measures the Hamming distance between
the two bit-strings X and Y that encode the biometric sample and tem-
plate (e.g., [7, 35,47]).
The attack basically consists of n runs of the proposed attack method
to successfully authenticate to the system, where n is the input length. In
general, for an n-bit string Y = (y1, . . . , yn), an attacker must roughly try
2n search for X to pass the authentication successfully and it is infeasible
for large n. However, using the proposed attack a corrupted P1 i can
authenticate the system after at most n trials (because the number of 0s
or 1s in Y is between 0 and n, i.e., 0 ≤ ` ≤ n). More precisely, starting
` = 1 until ` = n a corrupted P1 runs the proposed attack method, and
because 0 ≤ ` ≤ n the authentication is successful with at most n trials
(without any knowledge of the real input X).
(c) Apply the Attack for Uniformly Distributed Inputs
This attack can also be directly applied to uniformly distributed bit
strings X and Y . In this scenario the input bit-strings of P2 (which is
generated from a biometric template) is expected to be independent and
identically distributed. That is, there are nearly equal number of zeros
and ones in an input bit string. Below, we show that this fact easily allows
an adversary to minimize the Hamming distance and successfully deceive
a verifier:
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1. P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each yi is either 0 or 1.
2. P1 picks random ri’s and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri.
3. Instead of computing (ai, bi) = (ri+xi, ri+ x˜i), P1 computes (ai, bi) =
(ri−2−1, ri+2−1) in order to make the commitmentsAi = CommitP1,i(ai)
and Bi = CommitP1,i(bi). The authors in [8] uses homomorphic en-
cryption as the commitment mechanism. Since those cryptosystems
work in a group of prime order, the multiplicative inverse of 2 always
exists, i.e. P1 can commit to (ai, bi) = (ri − 2−1, ri + 2−1). Next P1
proves that |bi − ai| = 1 which always holds. Note that P1 does not
prove the validity of her input, i.e, she does not prove that the xi’s
are equal to either 0 or 1.
4. COTs are run, and in one half of the COTs (because of the uniform
distributed inputs), P2 receives ti=ri − 2−1 and ti = ri + 2−1 in the
other half.
5. P2 computes T =
n∑
i=1
ti. Since yi’s are equally distributed, i.e. the
numbers of 0s and 1s in {y1, . . . , yn} are nearly equal, P2 computes
T =
(∑
i
ri + 2
−1
)
+
(∑
i
ri − 2−1
)
=
n∑
i=1
ri = R ± k2−1 for some
small k  n.
6. Using the 2nd option, K = CommitP2,i(2R+n) = A1 · · ·An ·B1 · · ·Bn.
7. P1 sends R and the proof that K commits to 2R+ n to P2.
8. P2 computes dH(X,Y ) = T − R = k where k  n and successfully
authenticates P1 since k will be less than the threshold value.
(d) Our Solution for the Attack
The weakness of the full scheme is due to the zero-knowledge proof of a
wrong statement used for validation of the input pairs {(ai, bi), ∀i = 1, . . . , n}.
A malicious P1 can easily exploit this weakness as described in the previ-
ous section. Therefore, logical statements of zero-knowledge proofs should
be carefully checked against these kinds of adversarial behaviors.
As a security fix, we modify the step in which P1 generates random
ri values. Namely, after generating each ri, P1 computes and publishes
Ai = Commit(ri + xi), Bi = Commit(ri + x˜i) and Ri = Commit(ri). Next,
P1 sends the zero-knowledge proof of the following statement
((ai − ri) = 0 ∨ (bi − ri) = 0) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1
that is equivalent to
(ai + bi − 2ri = 1) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1
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using the commitments Ai, Bi and Ri. This new statement contains one
more relation than the one in the original proof of [8]. Although the com-
putation cost of the protocol is slightly increased, the validation process
now assures the security of the protocol.
Note that if the new statement (ai + bi − 2ri = 1) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1 is
true then only one of the following two cases can occur:
ai = bi + 1⇒ 2bi + 1− 2ri = 1⇒ bi = ri, ai = ri + 1
bi = ai + 1⇒ 2ai + 1− 2ri = 1⇒ ai = ri, bi = ri + 1
In Section 7 we provide the security analysis of the improved scheme.
More Efficient Solution for Biometric Authentication Biometric
authentication systems are designed to tolerate a small level of errors.
In general, the measure process is not perfect in most environments and
thus, instead of exact match, a biometric system authenticates a party
that matches with a small error to prevent false negatives.
The authentication process must also have a small complexity to com-
pute the result in the fastest way. Therefore each party must prove nothing
more than the necessary and sufficient data for validation of her input.
These motivations lead us to design a more efficient proof that can be
used in the biometric authentication systems. Namely, after generating
and publishing the commitments to ai, bi, ri as in the previous section, P1
sends the proof of:
ai + bi − 2ri = 1.
The above relation has a smaller complexity than |bi−ai| = 1 while it still
provides higher security. This input validation method is an efficient so-
lution for our attack in the case of biometric authentication. Note that an
adversary may input (ai, bi) = (ri−2−1, ri+ 2−1) and pass the validation
but its Hamming distance is n2 which is the expected value of Hamming
distance between two random inputs with length n.
(e) Efficiency Enhancements
In this section, we present some improvements for the efficiency of the
protocol. First, we reduce the computational complexity of the protocol
using VOT instead of COT without sacrificing the security. Namely, COT
is not necessary in the case where P2 computes the final Hamming dis-
tance. Next we reduce the complexity of the proof for the validity of P1’s
inputs in the case of biometric authentication.
16 Mehmet Sabır Kiraz1, Ziya Alper Genc¸1,3, and Su¨leyman Kardas¸1,2
COT versus VOT Verifiable Oblivious Transfer (like COT) [48] is also
a natural combination of
(
2
1
)
-OT and commitments. Let CommitS and
CommitC be commitments by Sender and Chooser respectively. In a VOT
protocol, the Sender has (x0, x1), the Chooser has y ∈ {0, 1} and the
commitments CommitS(x0), CommitS(x1),CommitC(y) are common input. At the
end of the protocol the Chooser learns xy and the sender has no output. Note that the
difference with COT is that commitment to the output xy is not computed, i.e., VOT
is defined if the CommitC(xy) is not required as output. The functionality of VOT is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Sender
Private Input: x0, x1
Private Output: ⊥
Common Input:
CommitS(x0),
CommitS(x1),CommitC(y)
VOT←→
Chooser
Private Input: y
Private Output: xy
Fig. 2. Verifiable Oblivious Transfer
We note here the two main aspects of COT vs. VOT:
What to transfer
{
bits x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}
strings x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}k
Committed Output
{
yes→ COT
no → VOT
We show that the basic protocol in [8] does not have to use COT in the case that
the server computes the result (i.e., VOT is already sufficient because it is not necessary
to compute the final commitment.).
Efficiency Improvement Using VOT In this section, we point out a compu-
tational complexity reduction. Note that COT is run for the malicious case in [8]. COT
requires the receiver to obtain the output together with its commitment to this value.
In the beginning of the protocol, the input of P1 is an n-bit string X = (x1, . . . , xn)
and the input of P2 is an n-bit string Y = (y1, . . . , yn). After running the protocol
there are two options:
– P1 obtains the Hamming distance dH(X,Y ) and P2 obtains nothing
– P2 obtains the Hamming distance dH(X,Y ) and P1 obtains nothing
In case P2 computes the Hamming distance, the committed values from the output
of COT is not used. In such case, these commitments are not necessary to be computed,
and therefore VOT is sufficient to use. We realized this observation after writing the
COT protocol explicitly with the overall protocol instead of using as a black box. If P1
computes the Hamming distance COT is still necessary to use.
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6 Our Fixed and Improved Scheme
We made the modifications to the full scheme of [8] in order to fix the security weakness
described in Section 5 and improve the efficiency of the protocol as mentioned in Section
(e). Now, we give the corrected scheme with all details:
Inputs:
– P1 inputs an n-bit string X = (x1, . . . , xn)
– P2 inputs an n-bit string Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
Outputs:
– 1st Option: P1 obtains dH(X,Y ) and P2 obtains nothing
– 2nd Option: P2 obtains dH(X,Y ) and P1 obtains nothing
Protocol:
1. P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each of yi is either 0 or 1.
2. P1 generates random ri’s from the plaintext space of Commit and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri.
3. P1 commits to (ai, bi, ri) = (ri+xi, ri+x˜i, ri). P1 publishes Ai = Commit(ai), Bi =
Commit(bi) and Ri = Commit(ri).
4. P1 proves that (|ai − ri| = 0 ∨ |bi − ri| = 0) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1 using Ai, Bi and Ri.
5. For each i = 1, . . . , n, a COT is run where
– P1 acts as the sender and P2 as the receiver.
– P2’s selection bit is yi.
– P1’s input bit is (ai, bi).
– The output obtained by P2 is ti = ri + (xi ⊕ yi).
– Both parties obtain Ci = Commit(ti).
6. P2 computes T =
n∑
i=1
ti
7. 1st Option: Run VOT
(a) P1 computes K = Commit(2R + n) = A1 · · ·An ·B1 · · ·Bn.
(b) P1 sends R to P2 and proves that K commits to 2R + n.
(c) P2 computes K = A1 · . . . An ·B1 · · ·Bn and checks that K = Commit(2R+n).
(d) If all verifications are successful, P2 outputs T −R.
2nd Option: Run COT
(a) P2 computes C = Commit(T ) = C1 · · ·Cn.
(b) P2 sends T to P1 and proves that C commits to T.
(c) P1 computes C = C1 · · ·Cn and verifies the proof.
(d) If all verifications are successful, P1 outputs T −R.
7 Security Analysis of Our Scheme
A cryptographic protocol is secure if the view of an adversary in a real protocol ex-
ecution can be generated from the information the adversary has (i.e., its input and
output). In this section, we proved the security of the proposed protocol by construct-
ing a simulator, which is given only the input and output of the “corrupted” party,
and generating a view that is indistinguishable from the view of the adversary in a
real protocol execution [13–16]. This implies that the adversary learns no information
from the real protocol because it could generate anything from what it sees in such an
execution by itself.
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P1 P2
X = x1 . . . xn, xi ∈ {0, 1}, skP1 Y = y1 . . . yn, yi ∈ {0, 1}, skP2
Compute CommitP2,i(yi) ∀i = 1 . . . n ∈R Z∗q
CommitP2,i (yi)+Prove that yi=0 or yi=1,∀i=1...n←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Pick r1, . . . , rn ∈R Zn+1
Compute R =
n∑
i=1
ri
Compute (ai, bi) = (ri + xi, ri + x˜i) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Ai = CommitP1,i(ai) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Bi = CommitP1,i(bi) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Ri = CommitP1,i(ri) ∀i = 1 . . . n
<Ai,Bi,Ri+Prove that ((ai−ri)=0 or (bi−ri)=0) and |bi−ai=1|,∀i=1...n>−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1st Option:
<VOT((Ai,Bi);CommitP2,i (yi)):∀i=1...n>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Obtain ti where ti = ri + xi ⊕ yi ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute T =
n∑
i=1
ti
Compute K = CommitP2,i(2R+ n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi Compute CommitP2,i(2R+ n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi
R+Prove that K commits to (2R+ n)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
dH(X,Y ) = T −R
2nd Option:
<COT((Ai,Bi);CommitP2,i (yi)):∀i=1...n>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Obtain ti and Ci = Commit(ti) where
ti = ri + xi ⊕ yi ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute T =
n∑
i=1
ti
Compute Commit(T ) =
n∏
i=1
Ci Compute C = Commit(T ) =
n∏
i=1
Ci
T+Prove that C=Commit(T )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
dH(X,Y ) = T −R
Fig. 3. Our Improved Scheme
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Theorem 1. The proposed protocol, which is shown in Figure 3, is secure in the pres-
ence of static malicious adversaries.
Proof. We show that given a party is corrupted, there exists a simulator that can
produce a view to the adversary that is statistically indistinguishable from the view
in the real protocol execution based on its private decryption share as well as public
information.
Case-1-P1 is corrupted. Let AP1 be an adversary corrupting P1. We construct a
simulator SP1 and show that the view of the adversary AP1 in the simulation with SP1
is statistically close to its view in a hybrid execution of the protocol with a trusted
party running the VOT (resp. COT) protocol. Since we assume that the VOT (resp.
COT) protocol is secure, we analyze the security of the protocol in the hybrid model
with a trusted party computing the VOT (resp. COT) functionality. Note that the
simulator SP1 knows X, skP1 for the 1
st option where VOT is run (in the 2nd the
simulator also knows dH(X,Y )). The simulator proceeds as follows:
1. SP1 picks arbitrary Y˜ = y˜1 . . . y˜n and computes ˜CommitP2,i . SP1 can simulate the
proofs since it knows the committed input values y˜i’s and skP1 .
2. In case of VOT is run:
(a) SP1 first extracts the input of RP1 from VOT functionality in the hybrid model,
then sends the input to the trusted party and learns the output value t˜i.
(b) SP1 computes T˜ =
n∑
i=1
t˜i and computes CommitP2,i(2R + n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi as in
the real protocol.
In case of COT is run:
(a) SP1 first extracts the input of RP1 from COT functionality in the hybrid
model, then sends the input to the trusted party and learns the output value
t˜i and C˜i = Commit(t˜i) ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
(b) SP1 computes T˜ =
n∑
i=1
t˜i and Commit(T˜ ) =
n∏
i=1
C˜i as in the real protocol.
(c) SP1 can simulate the proof since it knows the committed input value T˜ ’s,
dH(X,Y ) and skP1 .
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication protocol for the simulator
is simulated and this completes the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript
is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the verifier’s view when interacting
with honest P2.
Case-2-P2 is corrupted. Let AP2 be an adversary corrupting P2, we construct a
simulator SP2 as follows. Since we assume that the COT (resp. VOT) protocol is
secure, we analyze the security of the protocol in the hybrid model with a trusted
party computing the COT (resp. VOT) functionality. Note that the simulator SP2
knows Y = y1 . . . yn, skP2 and dH(X,Y ) for the 1
st option where VOT is run (in the
2nd the simulator does not know dH(X,Y )). The simulator proceeds as follows:
1. SP2 picks arbitrary X˜ = x˜1 . . . x˜n.
2. SP2 picks r˜i ∈R Z∗q and computes R˜P2 =
n∑
i=1
r˜i. Next, SP2 computes (a˜i, b˜i) =
(r˜i + x˜i, r˜i + x˜i) ∀i = 1 . . . n. SP2 computes A˜i, B˜i and R˜i as in the real protocol.
SP2 can again simulate the proofs since he knows the committed input values and
skP2 .
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3. In case VOT is run:
(a) SP2 first extracts the input of RP1 from VOT functionality in the hybrid
model and then sends the input to the trusted party. SP2 next computes K˜ =
CommitP2,i(2R˜+n). SP2 can simulate the proof since it knows the committed
input value R, dH(X,Y ) and skP2 .
In case COT is run:
(a) SP2 first extracts the input ofRP1 from COT functionality in the hybrid model
and then sends the input to the trusted party and learn Ci ∀i = 1, . . . , n. SP2
computes Commit(T˜ ) =
n∏
i=1
C˜i.
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication protocol for the simulator
is simulated and this completes the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript
is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the verifier’s view when interacting
with honest P1.
8 Complexity Analysis Of Our Fixed Protocol
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of our fixed protocol and
compare it with the full scheme of Bringer et al. [8]. In our protocol, the number
of invoked zero-knowledge proofs and multiplication of ciphertexts remain the same.
However, we improved the efficiency of the protocol significantly by replacing n COTs
with n VOTs in the second option of the protocol where P2 computes the final Hamming
distance. In this way, we show that n commitments, 2n partial decryptions and 2n ZK
proofs can be removed. The number of commitments of P1 is increased from 2n to 3n
in order to guarantee the validity of P1’s inputs. This is the price that should be paid
to make the protocol secure. The complexity comparison of the full scheme of Bringer
et al. [8] and our fixed protocol is illustrated in Figure 1.
Scheme of
Bringer et al.
Our Fixed
Scheme
P1 P2 P1 P2
Commitments 2n n 3n n
ZK proofs n
OTs n COTs
1st opt: n COTs
2nd opt: n VOTs
Multiplication
of ciphertexts
1st opt: n
2nd opt: 2n
Table 1. Complexity Comparison
Our analysis shows that the additional cost of the security fix is only n com-
mitments made by P1, independent of the party which computes the final Hamming
distance. However, in the case that P2 computes the final Hamming distance, the com-
putational savings that can be achieved by replacing the n COTs with n VOTs are
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far larger. In general, a COT protocol requires one more flow than a VOT protocol in
which the chooser recommits to its received value and proves that the new commit-
ment equals to her previous committed input. In particular, the full scheme in [8] uses
the COT scheme of [11] where each run of a COT protocol requires one commitment,
two partial decryption of a ciphertext and two zero-knowledge proofs in addition to
a VOT protocol. As a result, we avoid unnecessary use of two zero-knowledge proofs
and two partial decryptions. Consequently, we improve the efficiency of the protocol
significantly while we establish the security of the protocol.
9 Conclusion
Bringer et al. [8] proposed two Hamming distance computation schemes which can
be applied to biometric authentication systems. Their basic scheme is secure in the
semi-honest setting. However, their full protocol is not sound in the malicious model.
In this paper, we show that the full scheme of Bringer et al. [8] has an issue with
respect to soundness. In our attack, we show that an adversary without having any
prior knowledge can make the verifier compute an incorrect Hamming distance. In
the case of biometric authentication systems, a malicious user can easily authenticate
without any information about the honest party. Namely, the complexity of the security
of the system is reduced from O(2n) to O(n), where n is the input length. Moreover,
we fix the protocol by placing a robust method for input validation without adding a
significant cost. We also enhance the efficiency of their protocol significantly by showing
that Verifiable Oblivious Transfer (VOT) is sufficient to use instead of Committed
Oblivious Transfer (COT) in the second option of the full scheme. The VOT reduction
avoids the unnecessary computation of one commitment, two zero-knowledge proofs
and two partial decryptions of the ciphertext for each bit of the input.
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